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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 












) ________________ ) 




DR. JEFFREY GALLUPS and MIL TON 
HALL SURGICAL CENTER, LLC d/b/a/ 
ENT INSTITUTE 
Defendants. 
Civil Action File No. 2016CV275265 
Bus. Ct. Div. 2 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS1 
The above styled matter is before the Court on Defendants Dr. Jeffrey Gallups and 
Milton Hall Sw·gical Associates, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Breach of Contract Claims ("Motion 
to Dismiss"). Having considered the pleadings and argument of counsel at a hearing held on 
September 15, 2017, the Courl herein grants the Motion to Dismiss, finding as follows: 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Defendant Dr. Jeffrey Gallups ("Gallups") owns Defendant Milton Hall Surgical 
Associates, LLC d/b/a ENT Institute ("ENT Institute"), which provides ear, nose, and throat 
related medical services. Plaintiff John Souza ("Souza") is a former investment bank finance 
executive and entrepreneur who assists businesses in developing strategies for growth in 
healthcare, solar energy, software, and social media. Co-Plaintiff Paradise Media Ventures, LLC 
("Paradise") is Souza's wholly-owned company. 
Souza and Gallups met in early 2013 and thereafter discussed ideas and opportunities to 
grow the ENT Institute practice. On or about July 15, 2014, upon Souza and Paradise's request, 
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Gallups, on behalf of ENT Institute, entered into a Non-Disclosure Agreement (''NDA") with 
Paradise. Neither Souza nor Gallups is a party to the NDA. Section IV of the NDA contains a 
non-circumvention provision which states: 
During the term of this Agreement and for three years thereafter, 
[ENT Institute] will not attempt to do business with, or otherwise 
solicit any business contact or relationship created or referred by 
[Paradise] during the term of agreement. If such breach by [ENT 
Institute] results i11 a circumvention, th[u]s preventing [Paradise] 
from realizing or recognizing a profit, fees, or otherwise, without 
the specific written approval [Paradise] shall be entitled to any 
actual or projected revenues due pursuant to this Agreement or 
relating to such transaction. 
Around this time Souza introduced Gallups to an acquaintance, Dr. John Berberian 
("Berberian"), who owned a company that distributes allergy testing services provided by United 
Allergy Service ("UAS"), and the parties discussed opportunities to provide allergy testing 
services to ENT Institute. On September 13, 2014, ENT Institute and Pinnacle MSO, LLC 
("Pinnacle"), a Management Service Organization ("MSO") registered by Berberian, entered into 
an MSO agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Pinnacle was entitled to a percentage of the 
collections for certain services rendered for each ENT Institute location utilizing a UAS 
Licensing Agreement. 
However, in February 20 I 5, Pinnacle and ENT Institute disagreed on the calculation of 
the amounts owed to Pinnacle. In April 2015, ENT Institute terminated the MSO agreement with 
Pinnacle effective June 19, 2015. Souza claims Defendants have violated the non-circumvention 
provision in the NDA because ENT Institute is still providing allergy services distributed by 
Berberian's company after the MSO Agreement terminated, resulting in a "circumvention" as set 
forth in the NDA. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) breach of 
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contract; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) attorney's fees. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss does not 
implicate claims (2) and (3). 
ANALYSIS 
Motion to Dismiss Standard 
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-12(b)(6), a court shall not sustain a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless "(I) the allegations of the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could 
not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a 
grant of the relief sought." Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171,171 (2012). The 
court must construe all pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must 
resolve all doubts regarding such pleadings in the non-moving party's favor. Id.; Anderson v. 
Daniel, 314 Ga. App. 394, 395 (2012). 
The central issue raised by Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is whether the NDA, and 
specifically the non-circumvention provision set forth therein, is enforceable against Defendants. 
In light of the fact-specific analysis required to determine the reasonableness and enforceability 
of the non-circumvention provision, Plaintiffs assert in their response brief that "it would seem 
impossible for the Court to consider the factual circumstances and grant a motion to dismiss't.' It 
is true that the court must generally consider the factual setting of a restrictive covenant to 
determine its reasonableness. Nevertheless, a trial court may dismiss a breach of restrictive 
covenant claim if the pleadings clearly demonstrate the duration of the restrictive covenant is 
indefinite and unascertainable and its scope is overly broad. Alw Mktg. Corp. v. Hill, 205 Ga. 
App. 194, 195-8 ( 1992). 
Plaintiffs' Response, p. 4 al footnote I. 
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In Alw, the appellant claimed the trial court could not dispose of the complaint on the 
basis of the pleadings under O.C.G.A. §9-11-12 on a motion to dismiss, because it could not 
determine the validity of the restrictive covenants at issue except by examining the 
reasonableness of each covenant in '"the particular factual setting to which it is applied,'" Id. at 
195 (citing National Teen-Ager Co. v. Scarborough, 254 Ga. 467, 469 (1985)). However, the 
Court of Appeals found that argument unavailing, reasoning: 
The question is not merely whether the covenants are reasonable or 
reasonably necessary, but whether they are enforceable at law. 
Hill's agreement that the covenants are reasonable does not salvage 
what is inherently unreasonable, uncertain and unenforceable, as a 
matter of law to be reasonably determined by courts ... The 
covenants cannot be enforced, at least for the reason that their 
period of application, which depends upon the "term of the 
agreement," cannot reasonably and with certainty be ascertained, 
and the employee cannot with any degree of accuracy forecast the 
extent of the duty owed in terms of time ... 
Proof of additional facts wiJl not affect the inherent variability and 
uncertainty of these covenants as to time and "term." That is, they 
are not invalid merely because of a conceivable factual 
circumstance, but because it cannot be ascertained by the employee 
at any given time whether and to what extent they apply. 
Id. at 198. Further, the appellate court found the scope of the restriction unreasonably broad as a 
matter of law, rendering it void, because it purported to restrict the defendant's ability to do any 
kind of business with certain contacts regardless of whether that business was related or not to 
the type of business opportunity referred by the plaintiff. 
On a motion for reconsideration, the appellant in Alw again argued the validity of the 
restrictive covenant at issue could only be determined by examining the factual setting of the 
parties' agreement and that it was entitled to a full cvidcntiary hearing. In denying 
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals again noted the indefiniteness of the restrictive covenant 
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and that its term was unascertainable such that, irrespective of what is "reasonable", the covenant 
was as a matter of law unenforceable: 
The rule as to motions to dismiss is that a motion to dismiss may 
be granted if "'the averments in the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of facts that could be proved in support of the claim.'" Uni.on 
Camp Corp. v. Southern Bulk Indus., 193 Ga. App. 90, 386 S.E.2d 
866; OCGA § 9-ll-l 2(b ). The statement in National Teen-Ager 
Co. and Watson that on motion for judgment on the pleadings a 
court must accept as true an averment that a non-compete 
agreement is "reasonable" does not mean the covenant must be 
accepted as capable of being clear of ascertainment, definite, and 
reasonably enforceable. A provision may be reasonable as to 
"duration, territorial coverage, and scope of activity," but may 
nevertheless be so flawed and indefinite that it cannot be enforced; 
these are separate matters. There is no mandate that compels a 
court to accept as "reasonable" what is inherently illogical or self- 
contradictory, or is too indefinite to even ascertain what it means 
or when it applies. Appellants are insisting on an illogical 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions, so as to litigate the 
"factual setting" of what cannot be ascertained as a matter of logic 
and what necessarily must be decided against them on legal 
grounds ... 
Id. Thus, where the pleadings plainly disclose that a restrictive covenant 1s unenforceable, 
dismissal is appropriate. 
No Privily of Contract as to Defendant Gallups 
Here, although Plaintiffs contend the NOA was expressly applicable to employees by 
virtue of Paragraph D, the second sentence of that paragraph makes clear that an employee to 
whom Confidential Information is disclosed must sign a non-disclosure agreement at Paradise's 
request. Plaintiffs do not allege that Gallups is his individual capacity signed a separate non- 
disclosure agreement or that they ever requested that he do so. Rather, they assert in their 
Amended Complaint: "Gallups digitally executed the agreement on behalf of ENT Institute."3 
3 Amended Comp la int, ~ 18. 
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Insofar as there is nothing in the NDA that expressly binds Gallups, there is no privity of 
contract and it is not enforceable against him. See Souza v. Berberjan, 802 S.E.2d 401, 404-5 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of Berberian in a related 
case in which Sousa attempted to enforce an NDA containing the same non-circumvention 
provision against Berberian individually, holding "an action on a contract ... shall be brought ... 
against the party who made it. ... ", and "because Berberian was not a party to the agreement, 
Souza cannot enforce it against him"). See also Villanueva v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 313 Ga. 
App. 164, 166 (20 l l) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment to insurer on its breach 
of contract claim, holding "[a]n agent who, acting within the scope of his authority, enters into 
contractual relations for a disclosed principal does not bind himself, in the absence of an express 
agreement to do so"). 
The Non-Circumvention Provision Constitutes a Restrictive Covenant 
Defendants argue the non-circumvention clause constitutes a restrictive covenant under 
Georgia's restrictive covenant statutes, O.C.G.A. §§13-8-50 et seq., as set forth in O.C.G.A. §13- 
8-51(15), which defines "restrictive covenant" as: 
[A]n agreement between two or more parties that exists to protect 
the first party's or parties' interest in property, confidential 
information, customer good will, business relationships, 
employees, or any other economic advantages that the second party 
has obtained for the benefit of the first party or parties, to which 
the second party has gained access in the course of his or her 
relationship with the first party or parties, or which the first party 
or parties has acquired from the second party as the result of a sale. 
Such restrictive covenants may exist within or ancillary to 
contracts between or among employers and employees, distributors 
and manufacturers, lessors and lessees, partnerships and partners, 
employers and independent contractors, franchisors and 
franchisees, and sellers and purchasers of a business or commercial 
enterprise and any two or more employers. A restrictive covenant 
shall not include covenants appurtenant to real property. 
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The Court has some reservations as to whether O.C.G.A. §13-8-51 (15) applies because 
Article 8 expressly limits it application to contracts as between only certain types of parties: 
(a) The provisions of this article shall be applicable only to 
contracts and agreements between or among: (I) Employers and 
employees; (2) Distributors and manufacturers; (3) Lessors and 
lessees; ( 4) Partnerships and partners; ( 5) Franchisors and 
franchisees; (6) Sellers and purchasers of a business or commercial 
enterprise; and (7) Two or more employers. 
(b) The provisions of this article shall not apply to any contract 
or agreement not described in subsection (a) of this Code 
section. 
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-52 (emphasis added). 
Paradise and ENT Institute do not appear to fall squarely into any of the categories 
outlined above and, thus, their contract would not appear to be subject to Article 8. Nevertheless, 
the only Georgia case cited by the parties addressing a non-circumvention clause found it to be a 
restrictive covenant. See Swartz Investments. LLC v. Vion Pharm .. Inc., 252 Ga. App. 365, 367- 
68 (2001) (holding non-circumvention provision wh.icb limited the defendant's ability to conduct 
business directly or indirectly with 'certain investors without the plaintiff's written permission 
placed limitations on the defendant's future business activities such that it was in partial restraint 
of trade and constituted a restrictive covenant). Thus, whether construed under Article 8 or 
Georgia common law, insofar as the non-circumvention clause purports to limit ENT Institute's 
future business activities, it constitutes a restrictive covenant and must be construed as such. 
Non-Circumvention Clause is Unenforceable 
A restrictive covenant which imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade is void as against 
public policy. See Northsidc Hosp .. Inc. v. McCord, 245 Ga. App. 245, 247 (2000). "A three- 
element test of duration, territorial coverage, and scope of activity has evolved as a helpful tool 
in examining the reasonableness of the particular factual setting to which [a restrictive covenant] 
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is applied." Id.; Sysco Food Svcs. &c. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585 (1997). Here, regardless 
of the level of scrutiny applied, the Court finds the non-circumvention provision constitutes an 
unenforceable restraint on trade because it does not include an ascertainable limitation on 
duration and its scope is unreasonably broad. 
(1) Limitation on Duration 
"[Ujncertainty as to the 'term of the agreement' renders [a restrictive covenant] void" as 
a matter of law. Alw Mktg. Corp., 205 Ga. App. at 196 (holding restrictive covenants uncertain, 
unreasonable and void where the period of each covenant provided restrictions for a certain 
number of years "after termination of the agreement" but the term of the agreement was to begin 
on an "effective date" which could be designated and changed by the employer without notice 
and the effective termination of the agreement could not be reasonably ascertained). 
In this case, Defendants argue the term of the non-circumvention clause is not 
ascertainable, and there is no way for them to determine its term tlu·ough the language of the 
clause because the NDA does not specify a term. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiffs contend 
the term is ascertainable as being three years in length, such ignores the express language of the 
non-circumvention provision which purports to limit the ENT Institute's future business 
activities "during the term of this agreement and three years thereafter" (emphasis added). 
Without an ascertainable term, there is no way to determine when the "three year thereafter" 
period begins to run and, thus, no way to ascertain the duration of the non-circumvention clause. 
Plaintiffs also argue the term of the NOA should be inferred as the duration of the parties' 
association, analogizing the NDA with an employment agreement of "at-will employees whose 
restrictions are during the term of the employment and a specific term post-employment.t" 
~ Plaintiffs' Response, p. 5. 
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However, as noted by Defendants in their reply brief, 5 the NOA is different from at-will 
employment contracts which are governed by statute. See O.C.G.A. §34-7-1 ("An indefinite 
hiring may be terminated at will by either party"). The unique arrangement between these parties 
contemplates on-going business relationships, making it patently different from an at-will 
employment arrangement and Plaintiffs do not provide any legal authority that would allow the 
Court to infer the term. Consequently, the lack of any durational limitation on the non- 
circumvention clause renders it void and unenforceable. 
(2) Limitation on Scope of Prohibited Business Activities 
An across-the-board restriction on future business transactions with no reasonable 
limitation as to scope is unenforceable as a matter of law. See Swartz lnvs., 252 Ga. App. at 370 
(finding non-circumvention clause unreasonable because it prohibited a party from entering into 
any business transaction, whether investment related or not, with six named investors); Allied 
Infonnation Inc. v. Yeruva, 251 Ga. App. 404, 406 (1999) (holding non-solicitation clause in 
employment agreement unreasonable because it prohibited all business with the employer's 
clients, even business unrelated to the type of work the employee had done for the employer). 
Here, Defendants argue the non-circumvention provision unreasonably prohibits ENT 
Instirute's ability to solicit or conduct any type of business activity with anyone or any business 
Paradise referred to it. Again, the Court agrees. Although Plaintiffs assert "the sole object [sic] of 
the NCA was to protect the value of the introduction between Gallups and Berberian.:" the 
subjective intent of the parties is immaterial. The express language of the non-circumvention 
clause-"(ENT Institute] will not attempt to do business with, or otherwise solicit any business 
contact or relationship created or referred by [Paradise] during the term of agreement" ( emphasis 
5 Defendants' Reply, pp. 1-2. 
6 Plaintiffs' Response, p. 4. 
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added)-covers a much broader scope of prohibited activity. First, the provision is not limited to 
the referral to Berberian. Further, it effectively prevents ENT Institute from engaging or even 
soliciting any business contact or relationship "created or referred" by Paradise in any kind of 
business transaction, even if it is wholly unrelated to Paradise's initial referral or Plaintiffs' 
claimed areas of expertise. Such is unreasonably broad and unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
dismisses .Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. The action will proceed on Plaintiffs' remaining 
claims. 
SO ORDERED this ~ day of November, 2017, nunc pro tune October 3, 2017. 
. :~ k.Q,.1>{9,, S IOR JUDGE 
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